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POSSIBLE NORTH VIETNAMESE CEASE-FIRE OFFER

1. This paper is premised on the hypothesis that in the near future the North Vietnamese will propose some form of new cease-fire offer, such as a "cease-fire in place". If that hypothesis is taken as a basis for discussion, however, there are at least two closely related corollaries that should also be taken as given. First, if the North Vietnamese are contemplating a cease-fire proposal (or any other major negotiating gambit) in the near future, then they are certain to make an all-out, cost-ignoring effort to improve their military position in the days and weeks ahead. If Hanoi is playing to any such short-run timetable, we can expect the communists to be willing to fight intensively almost without regard for losses and with minimal concern for conserving manpower or supply resources that might be needed in the more distant future. In short, if Hanoi envisages making a major political move in the near future, we should expect the communists to throw all their resources and capabilities into the current fighting, making a maximum effort that reserves little, if anything, for future use.

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2. The next assumption we should make is that they would surface their proposal for a cease-fire only after they have achieved some tangible military successes and have seized some politically and psychologically important real estate. We should expect them, therefore, to make the offer in a climate where they are clearly seen to be on the offensive and the South Vietnamese forces are clearly seen to be in a defensive posture.

3. A cease-fire in place in such circumstances has obvious military disadvantages from the Washington and Saigon perspectives. An appendix prepared by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff spells out some of these disadvantages in greater detail. Quite aside from the purely military aspects reflected in that paper, it can be further assumed that there will be political and psychological disadvantages from our perspective, especially if provincial capitals remain in North Vietnamese hands.

4. In any period in which the North Vietnamese seem to hold the initiative, emotions among non-communist South Vietnamese will clearly become charged. In such a context, acceptance of a cease-fire is likely to be emotionally equated with surrender. In such a

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hothouse, rumor-filled atmosphere, US consideration of any cease-fire proposition is almost certain to be read as an indication that the Americans are about to pull out, leaving the South Vietnamese isolated and alone. Thus discussion of cease-fire modalities or contemplation of cease-fire as a live prospect is likely, of itself, to have a corrosive effect on South Vietnamese will, morale, and cohesion, particularly in a time of military adversity when province capitals have fallen and the overall situation looks somewhat bleak.

5. The latter considerations will weigh very heavily in Saigon, where President Thieu has given orders that provincial capitals must be defended "at all costs". Thieu could be expected to reject the concept of agreeing to a standstill cease-fire which would emplace North Vietnamese forces in politically sensitive terrain and which would provide the PRG with a "capital" for its operations. He would be confirmed in this attitude, particularly if the military circumstances found him with most of his regular ARVN divisions still intact and never even committed to the battle. His instinct would predictably be to feel that, by rejecting the cease-fire and

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obtaining further time, his forces could roll the North Vietnamese out of the country and achieve the "decisive victory" of which he has spoken.

6. For these reasons there would, in the circumstances postulated, be a strong impulse to reject the cease-fire offer and to continue military actions over the summer months in the hope that a convincing defeat can be administered to the North Vietnamese.

7. However, against these initial considerations there are other factors which should be taken into account in contemplating a North Vietnamese cease-fire proposal. First there must be consideration of the North Vietnamese diplomatic alternatives. These center very largely around the American prisoners of war held by Hanoi. An astute public proposal involving the release of prisoners of war would be even more difficult to cope with than a simple cease-fire proposal. If, for example, Hanoi were to propose the release of all United States prisoners of war in return for the complete cessation of United States air and naval activity against North Viet-Nam, this could cause acute problems in Washington. Even if they simply proposed release of all United States prisoners of war in return for a specific early date

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for the withdrawal of all United States forces from the area, the public and Congressional difficulties would be acute.

8. Still a second consideration is the mood of the Congress and its capacity for emotionally-inspired cuts in the various appropriation measures which would have a bearing upon our capability to sustain our own and South Vietnamese military actions during the next six months. If a cease-fire were rejected and the Congress reacted, for example, by slashing the Defense and AID budgets or by refusing to grant a continuing resolution for Defense and AID expenditures after July 1, the results would be disastrous in both political and military dimensions.

9. Closely allied with the Congressional attitude would be the public sentiment in the United States which could be easily manipulated to suggest that we were passing up an opportunity to "stop the killing" and end the war. Particularly because this is an election year, public attitudes would be easily amenable to such charges and might be expected to sweep aside any effort to justify the rejection of a cease-fire proposal on grounds of military disadvantage.

10. Another consideration which should be borne

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in mind is the apparent capability of the North Vietnamese to continue a "rolling offensive" in various parts of South Viet-Nam over the next six months. Even if such an offensive did not capture significant additional territory, the very fact of its continuing existence would create the impression of the military initiative being retained by Hanoi to the detriment of Saigon.

11. Therefore any decision taken with respect to a cease-fire proposal should not be based on military considerations alone. Instead it should be weighed in a context which takes account of the considerations set out in paragraphs 7 through 10. It should also be made in the light of the terms and conditions which may be attached to the cease-fire proposal.

12. We should expect, for example, that the terms in which a cease-fire proposal might be made by Hanoi would contain many obnoxious features. We should also assume that it might make some use of the prisoner of war leverage by suggesting some inferential relationship between the acceptance of a cease-fire and the possible release of prisoners of war. In short, we should assume that such a pro-

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posal, if made, would have two basic purposes as part of its central design. The first of these purposes would be to seek a sharp split between Washington and Saigon. The second would be to go over the heads of the Administration and appeal directly to the American Congress and the American public.

13. Our own terms and conditions for a cease-fire in place need to be clearly understood as we evaluate those proposed by the other side. If we see no prospect of mutual withdrawal, our preferences include the following:

(a) All forces in South Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia will, on an agreed date, cease firing and remain in place.

(b) The cease-fire will encompass all hostile actions by main and local forces of both sides, including bombing, terrorism and other paramilitary activities. Reprisals and other acts of coercion will also be prohibited.

(c) During the cease-fire there will be no movement of main or local forces except for (1) defensive activity including patrols within specified zones close to

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the locations of these forces, and (2) withdrawals of US forces as agreed upon.

(d) There will be no augmentation of personnel or supplies beyond replacement levels; nor will there be any construction or improvement of military installations beyond maintenance levels.

(e) Population resettlement will be prohibited pending final settlement, except as agreed to by the negotiating parties subsequent to cease-fire implementation.

(f) The cease-fire will be monitored by (1) a new international supervisory body, and (2) a joint commission of the belligerents. The ISB will be staffed by personnel from countries mutually agreed upon by the parties in the dispute; it will be sufficiently large to (1) monitor principal points through which personnel/supplies enter the cease-fire area, and (2) investigate cease-fire violations reported to it. The DMZ will be re-established as a demilitarized zone under ISB supervision.

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(g) Unilateral air-sea reconnaissance will be continued in the cease-fire area pending effective operation of the ISB.

14. If a cease-fire in place proposal emanates from the other side, we will need to undertake immediate consultations with President Thieu. In those consultations, we should explain to him all those considerations contained in paragraphs 7 through 10. He should be made to realize that our decision will have to be made on the basis of broader considerations than the immediate military balance, and that those considerations would bear upon our continuing capability to provide support and assistance to South Viet-Nam.

15. From this consultation, or perhaps proceeding independently of it, we should press President Thieu to initiate military operations by his forces which will be clearly seen as offensive moves seizing the initiative in the fighting. Since the North Vietnamese have committed their forces in their entirety and concentrated them in three limited geographical areas, the South Vietnamese would appear to have some flexibility for the use of their main force units which are currently uncommitted to battle. If these forces can be used to alter the force ratios

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in the zones of intensive combat or otherwise to create the circumstances of offensive initiative, we should encourage such action.

16. In sum, it would be imprudent, in advance and in the abstract, to attempt to formulate a precise reaction to a cease-fire proposal offered by Hanoi. Instead, we will have to be prepared to evaluate it in the context of the military, political, and psychological circumstances existing in Viet-Nam and in the United States at the time such a proposal may be made. However, in preparation for such evaluation, it would be useful for us to review the subject as objectively as possible with President Thieu whenever we have any sound indication that such a proposal might be imminent.

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2 May 1972

A MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF AN  
IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE IN-PLACE

PURPOSE: To discuss the military implications should there be a DRV/PRG initiative for an immediate cease-fire in-place in:

- a. South Vietnam with the enemy holding Quang Tri and possibly Kontum.
- b. Indochina with the enemy holding Quang Tri and possibly Kontum.

ISSUE: Whether the acceptance of an immediate cease-fire in-place in either SVN or all of Indochina would be acceptable now or in the longer term. (See note below)

RECOMMENDED POSITION: From a military viewpoint, the United States should not accept or support any DRV/PRG proposal for an immediate cease-fire without pre-conditions which are clearly to its advantage. In all probability, however, such pre-conditions would be unacceptable to the DRV/PRG.

ASSUMPTIONS:

- a. The DRV/PRG's current position on a cease-fire as stated in their 7-point peace proposal will remain unchanged unless and until they believe a cease-fire would facilitate

NOTE: This assessment does not attempt to address the political implications within the United States of a cease-fire proposal.

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achievement of their military and/or political objectives.

(See TAB A for DRV/PRG 7-point proposal.)

b. The seizure and control of sufficient terrain in Laos, Cambodia and SVN, to include Quang Tri and possibly Kontum in SVN, by the NVA/VC during their current offensive operations could provide the DRV/PRG with sufficient reason to initiate a call for an immediate cease-fire in-place.

c. The DRV/PRG will in all probability honor a cease-fire just so long as it serves their best interests.

d. That the DRV/PRG will continue their political/military aggression during any period of a cease-fire.

BACKGROUND:

a. See TABS B through E for maps of opposing forces in SVN MRS 1 through 4, respectively.

b. See TAB F for map of enemy controlled areas in Laos.

c. See TAB G for map of enemy controlled areas in Cambodia.

d. See TAB H for additional background.

e. See TAB I for historical experience from 1954. This TAB highlights the flagrant violations by the DRV against the French after a cease-fire in Indochina in 1954.

DISCUSSION

a. Throughout SVN there are presently 141,000 enemy combat troops opposing 155,340 ARVN combat troops. These are broken down by MR as shown in the following chart and paragraphs:

(See TABS B through E for current friendly and enemy dispositions)

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ENEMY VERSUS FRIENDLY COMBAT FORCES IN THE RVN

	<u>ENEMY</u>			<u>FRIENDLY</u>	
MR-1	60,000 <sup>1/</sup>	( 6,500) <sup>2/</sup>	vs	41,043 <sup>3/</sup>	( 59,779) <sup>4/</sup>
MR-2	40,000	( 8,900)	vs	49,587	( 93,446)
MR-3	25,000	( 1,700)	vs	37,585	( 79,914)
MR-4	<u>16,000</u>	<u>( 9,100)</u>	vs	<u>27,125</u>	<u>(169,252)</u>
TOTAL	141,000	(26,200)	vs	155,340	(402,391)

1/ Enemy totals are approximate and include the maximum estimate of all personnel in NVA/VC combat units down to and including local forces.

2/ Enemy totals in parenthesis represent estimates of guerrilla forces.

3/ Friendly totals include all personnel in ARVN divisions, the VNMC division, separate regiments, artillery battalions, ranger brigades, and Ranger Border Defense Battalions.

4/ Friendly totals in parenthesis represent figures for RF and PF forces.

5/ The above should not be considered as quantitative exacts, but can be used for trend analysis in assessing opposing forces.

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b. With 60,000 enemy combat personnel in MR-1, the enemy controls the unpopulated mountainous areas of the region and the ruins of Quang Tri City. ARVN defenses are concentrated in the populous lowlands, with the majority of its forces in the Hue area. There are four RVNAF divisions in MR-1, including the Vietnamese Marine Division which is part of the JGS general reserve and normally stationed near Saigon. In the event of a cease-fire, the enemy would retain control of Quang Tri and some district headquarters and the GVN would probably have to retain its forces at or near present levels in MR-1 to maintain a reasonable deterrent against a possible enemy violation of any agreement.

c. There are two ARVN divisions in MR-2 deployed, for the most part, in the highlands of western Kontum Province. Remaining elements of these divisions, along with two Korean divisions, are employed in the more densely populated coastal lowlands. There is a total of 40,000 enemy combat personnel in MR-2, and they control the sparsely populated areas along the Cambodian and Lao borders as well as northwestern Kontum Province. In the eastern half of the region the Communists also have relatively firm control of northern Binh Dinh and the mountainous sections of Phu Yen. The lowland areas are under strong enemy pressure and increasing control, particularly northern Binh Dinh. The ARVN would have little flexibility

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in major unit deployment as a result of a cease-fire and this would leave a major portion of the region without the presence of a regular unit.

d. In MR-3 the enemy has some 25,000 combat personnel. He controls northern Binh Long and Tay Ninh Provinces--sparsely settled areas. Additionally, enemy activity has increased in the Dau Tieng area of Binh Duong Province. They have a strong presence and, as yet unmeasured amount of control in the western borders of Hau Nghai and Long An Provinces. The ARVN have deployed five divisions to the area, including most of the Airborne division, which is part of the JGS general reserve, and the 21st Division from MR-4. A cease-fire would give the enemy about one-third of Binh Long and Tay Ninh Provinces and the ARVN probably would be able to return the 21st Division to its regular operation area in MR-4.

e. In MR-4, the enemy control, based on 16,000 combat personnel, is spreading northward from Chuong Tieng into southern Phuoc Dinh. The Communists continue to control the U Minh Forest and are increasing their presence along its edges. They also are attempting to control the Cambodian border area of Chau Doc and Kien Giang Provinces. The redeployment of the 21st ARVN Division out of the region has

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significantly increased the areas of responsibility of the remaining two divisions which now must cover the entire delta. Border areas are only partially defended, thus generally increasing the threat of enemy take over.

f. Since last fall the enemy has made it clear that their purpose in staging an offensive in 1972 would be to defeat the Vietnamization and pacification programs. While efforts to prove that the ARVN is incapable of defending SVN have been more spectacular, the substantial successes of the counter-pacification effort have attracted less attention.

(1) In MR-1 enemy control of Quang Tri province is nearly complete.

(2) In the three lower provinces of MR-1, enemy forces threaten to disrupt GVN control of all but a handful of populated lowland districts.

(3) In MR-2 the enemy has seized three district towns in Binh Dinh and are threatening several more in that province.

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(4) In MR-3 the shock waves preceding the enemy advance into Binh Long Province have resulted in deteriorating security not only in Binh Long but in the northern tier of districts in Binh Duong as well. In this part of MR-3 the enemy has captured one district capital outright, caused the GVN to withdraw from a second, and now threatens two others.

(5) In MR-4, the enemy effort in the northern border province of Kein Tuong is aimed at reopening his infiltration routes through a previously pacified area into the populous eastern Mekong Delta. To the west, enemy attacks on territorial forces in Chuong Thien mark his effort to regain a presence in that centrally located province.

g. One of the principle reasons for the enemy's successes against the pacification program has been that ARVN is committed almost exclusively to containing the enemy's main force units and local defense has been the responsibility of territorial forces.

h. The most serious aspect of the current situation is the enemy's efforts to develop a series of political bases throughout SVN. At the start of the offensive the enemy could claim no populated area in the country to be under their political control. Now there are reports of communist political administrations being established in Gio Linh District of Quang Tri and Loc Niu District of Binh Long. Such developments, unless countered by the GVN, will strengthen the communist negotiating position. More dangerous

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still, these new communist controlled areas, if allowed to stay, would provide them forward positions to further erode GVN control and to launch future encroachments on the territorial sovereignty of SVN.

i. The GVN, GKR, and RLG will oppose any cease-fire which involves major territorial concessions unless forced to do so by a deteriorating military situation. (See TAB J for specific GVN, GKR, and RLG views.)

j. The immediate implementation of a cease-fire would significantly increase the difficulty of establishing an effective International Supervisory Body (ISD). As a minimum, the enemy would be presented with an extended period, probably of several months duration, in which they would be able to press their antipacification efforts. This situation would lead to incidents which in turn could lead to a collapse of the cease-fire.

k. The current ICC would be an ineffective agency on which to build an ISB. In addition, as currently organized under Indian chairmanship, it is unacceptable to the GVN.

1. During the last cease-fire paper presented to the SRG on 1 October 1971, it was clearly established that even under conditions most favorable to the US/GVN, the VC control position during a cease-fire in-place would improve. (Detailed assessments of Alternative 1, most favorable to Hanoi, and Alternative 2, most favorable to GVN, are shown at TAB K.) Under the impacts discussed above, the erosion of GVN control is expected to be both more severe and more rapid than projected at the time of the study.

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m. An in-place cease-fire would create major problems for the GVN. It would imply that the government had openly abandoned one of President Thieu's "Four Noes" - "No Loss of Territory to the Communists." This loss of prestige--really an admission of partial defeat--would shake the GVN.

n. The GVN cadre and the ARVN confidence in US support would be drastically reduced. They would probably seek to create as many incidents and violations of the cease-fire as possible. Ranking officials who could afford it would probably revive the habit of Swiss bank accounts which had appeared to be fading away. Investment would be drastically reduced. The ARVN would not reject Thieu immediately; there does not appear to be any alternative leader at this time. His ability to command, however, would be weakened.

o. The political opposition would immediately begin to agitate for reforms and change of the Government. The possibility of street demonstrations would be high. The various party factions would begin to maneuver for the best positions in the "Government of National Unity" which they would expect to appear.

p. A deteriorating political and military situation would almost certainly adversely impact on the RVNAF. A weakened president could tend to undermine the command structure. ARVN commanders would also cast about for a place in a new government. In a word, the RVNAF might also begin to seek an accommodation.

a. The primary provision that would lessen the adverse impact of a cease-fire would be the withdrawal of NVA units from SVN, Laos and Cambodia. The US should insist on this in any cease-fire negotiation. In return the US could guarantee the withdrawal of US forces.

b. An effective ISB would also lessen the adverse impact. Study has indicated need for ISB of 14,000 with on-site inspection rights.

POSSIBLE FRIENDLY ACTIONS JUST PRIOR TO AND DURING CEASE-FIRE IN-PLACE:

a. In SVN with the enemy holding two province capitals.

(1) Deny or limit access to the population by deploying forces in direct proximity to vulnerable populated areas.

(2) Prevent the enemy from occupying positions near major economic, industrial, or populated areas, and essential lines of communications by moving forces to consolidate government control.

(3) Conduct police operations to neutralize the VCI or their equivalents.

(4) Conduct ground interdiction, cordon and search, and police operations in order to raise the level of security in populated areas under government control.

(5) Continue to provide assistance to the GKR and RLG.

(6) Continue a substantial US air capability in SEA, to include air operations in support of the GKR and RLG and air reconnaissance.

(7) Demand immediate negotiations for final settlement.

b. In Indochina with the enemy holding two province capitals in SVN.

(1) Deny or limit access to the population by deploying forces in direct proximity to vulnerable populated areas.

(2) Prevent the enemy from occupying positions near major economic, industrial, or populated areas, and essential lines of communication by moving forces to consolidate government control.

(3) Conduct police operations to neutralize subversive elements.

(4) Conduct ground interdiction, cordon and search, and police activities to raise the level of security in areas under government control.

(5) Continue a substantial US air capability in SEA, to air reconnaissance operations.

(6) Demand immediate negotiations for final settlement.

CONCLUSIONS: An immediate cease-fire in-place would:

a. Clearly be to the military advantage of the enemy who would be allowed to reinforce, resupply, and recuperate without interference.

b. Result in major territorial concessions to the DRV/PRG throughout Indochina.

c. Threaten the security of US/GVN Forces, which could be subjected to sudden onslaughts, carefully planned and executed, if the enemy chose to violate the cease-fire terms.

d. Have a significant psychological impact on both the military forces and the people throughout Indochina.

e. Allow the enemy to continue to exercise his capabilities for covert political-military actions, and undoubtedly enable him to improve his control position throughout Indochina.

f. Create political turmoil throughout Indochina at a time when no other strong pro-US leaders appear to be on the horizon.

g. Would undermine the credibility of the Nixon Doctrine in the eyes of other Southeast Asian nations.

h. See TAB L for more detailed assessment of advantages and disadvantages.

SEVEN-POINT PROPOSAL

1. Regarding the deadline for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces.

The U.S. Government must put an end to its war of aggression in Vietnam, stop the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war, withdraw from South Vietnam all troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the United States and of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, and dismantle all U.S. Bases in South Vietnam, without posing any condition whatsoever. The U.S. Government must set a terminal date for the withdrawal from South Vietnam of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp. If the U.S. Government sets a terminal date for the withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1971 of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, the parties will at the same time agree on the modalities

A) of the withdrawal in safety from South Vietnam of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp,

B) of the release of the totality of militarymen of all parties and of the civilians captured in the war (including American pilots captured in North Vietnam), so that they may all rapidly return to their homes.

These two operations will begin on the same date and will end on the same date.

A cease-fire will be observed between the South Vietnam People's Liberation Armed Forces and the Armed Forces of the United States and of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp as soon as the parties reach agreement on the withdrawal from South Vietnam of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp.

2. Regarding the question of power in South Vietnam.

The U.S. Government must really respect the South Vietnam People's right to self-determination, put an end to its interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam, cease backing the bellicose group headed by Nguyen Van Thieu at present in office in Saigon, and stop all maneuvers, including tricks on elections aimed at maintaining the puppet Nguyen Van Thieu.

TAB A

The political, social and religious forces in South Vietnam aspiring to peace and national concord will use various means to form in Saigon a new administration favoring peace, independence, neutrality and democracy. The provisional revolutionary government of the Republic of South Vietnam will immediately enter into talks with that administration in order to settle the following questions:

A) To form a broad three-segment government of national concord that will assume its functions during the period between the restoration of peace and the holding of general elections and organize general elections in South Vietnam.

A cease-fire will be observed between the South Vietnam People's Liberation Armed Forces and the Armed Forces of the Saigon administration as soon as a government of national concord is formed.

B) To take concrete measures with the required guarantees so as to prohibit all acts of terror, reprisal and discrimination against persons having collaborated with one or the other party; to ensure every democratic liberty to the South Vietnam people; to release all persons jailed for political reasons; to dissolve all concentration camps and to liquidate all forms of constraint and coercion so as to permit the people to return to their native places in complete freedom and to freely engage in their occupations.

C) To see that the people's conditions of living are stabilized and gradually improved, to create conditions allowing everyone to contribute his talents and efforts to heal the war wounds and rebuild the country.

D) To agree on measures to be taken to ensure the holding of genuinely free, democratic, and fair general elections in South Vietnam.

3. Regarding the question of Vietnamese Armed Forces in South Vietnam.

The Vietnamese parties will together settle the question of Vietnamese Armed Forces in South Vietnam in a spirit of national concord, equality, and mutual respect, without foreign interference in accordance with the post-war situation and with a view to making lighter the people's contributions.



4. Regarding the peaceful re-unification of Vietnam and the relations between the North and the South Zones.

A) The re-unification of Vietnam will be achieved step by step, by peaceful means on the basis of discussions and agreements between the two zones, without constraint and annexation from either party, without foreign interference.

Pending the re-unification of the country, the North and the South Zones will re-establish normal relations, guarantee free movement, free correspondence, free choice of residence, and maintain economic and cultural relations on the principle of mutual interests and mutual assistance.

All questions concerning the two zones will be settled by qualified representatives of the Vietnamese people in the two zones on the basis of negotiations, without foreign interference.

B) In keeping with the provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, in the present temporary partition of the country into two zones, the North and the South Zones of Vietnam will refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, from allowing any foreign country to have military bases, troops and military personnel on their soil, and from recognizing the protection of any country, of any military alliance of bloc.

5. Regarding the foreign policy of peace and neutrality of South Vietnam.

South Vietnam will pursue a foreign policy of peace and neutrality, establish relations with all countries regardless of their political and social regime, in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence, maintain economic and cultural relations with all countries, accept the cooperation of foreign countries in the exploitation of the resources of South Vietnam, accept from any country economic and technical aid without any political conditions attached, and participate in regional plans of economic cooperation.


On the basis of these principles, after the end of the war, South Vietnam and the United States will establish relations in the political, economic, and cultural fields.

6. Regarding the damages caused by the United States to the Vietnamese people in the two zones.

The U.S. Government must bear full responsibility for the losses and the destructions it has caused to the Vietnamese people in the two zones.


7. Regarding the respect and the international guarantee of the accords that will be concluded.


The parties will find agreement on the forms of respect and international guarantee of the accords that will be concluded.



NOTE: Separate NVA/VC regiments not shown.


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TAB D


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
NOTE: Separate NVA/VC regiments not shown.

TAB E

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BACKGROUND

1. The DRV's long-range goals remain unchanged: the reunification of North and South Vietnam under a communist regime and the establishment of its hegemony in Indochina. Thus, in the context of an immediate cease-fire in-place initiative by the DRV after the seizure of several provincial capitals by the NVA/VC, it may be that the current enemy offensive is designed to: force major concessions on cease-fire terms; place the DRV in a favorable position to continue struggling for its long-range goals under the conditions of a cease-fire; and place the communists in a favorable position should either side subsequently decide to renounce the cease-fire and reinitiate active hostilities. It should be noted that the foregoing is precisely what the DRV accomplished during 1954 in its conflict with the French.

2. On 26 January 1972, President Nixon announced a new 8-point plan for peace. While the DRV/PRG have been steadfast in their refusal to accept this plan, it is likely that they would accept the majority of points if we agreed to certain territorial concessions in the RVN. In particular, it is highly conceivable that the DRV/PRG would offer the immediate release of US POWs in exchange for an immediate cease-fire in-place. On balance, the DRV/PRG would undoubtedly attach great importance to the political and psychological gains established as the "Legal and Popular Government" in a provincial capital of the RVN.

3. During prior cease-fire discussions, it has consistently been the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that any form of cease-fire in-place is undesirable. The addition of a new dimension, i.e., conceding major population centers to the enemy, makes such a course of action even more undesirable. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the field commanders have always opted for a final settlement which includes provisions for a verified mutual withdrawal of all non-South Vietnamese Forces from the RVN.

4. The broader issue of a general cease-fire in-place, not linked to the concession of major population centers in the RVN to the enemy, must be addressed. As past studies have shown, even under conditions most favorable to the US/GVN, e.g., enemy main force units restricted to isolated sanctuaries and supervised by elements of a strong 14,000-man

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International Supervisory Body, VC control will increase and GVN control will decrease.

5. In the past, the US has handled DRV/PRG cease-fire proposals not on the merits of the cease-fire alone, but on the merits of any conditions which the other side attaches. When the DRV/PRG proposed a cease-fire linked to a coalition government, for example, the United States responded with a reiteration of the US desire for a cease-fire and then restated the position that it is for the people of South Vietnam to decide how they should be governed and by whom, and reaffirmed our readiness to accept their free decision in this matter. This same sort of scenario could be used in publicly reacting to an initiative by the other side for a cease-fire in-place linked to the concession of provincial capitals. Realizing that both sides have failed to agree on much less crucial issues in the past, it is doubtful that worldwide opinion would expect the US/GVN to accept a cease-fire proposal of this nature.

6. The recent deployments of carriers and air units to Southeast Asia to counter the present enemy offensive have established significant credibility for the Nixon Doctrine and the resolve of the United States to continue to support the GVN. This military, political, and psychological advantage could be lost should the United States associate itself with a cease-fire in-place linked to a major concession. It would be tantamount to an admission that Vietnamization had failed and that combined US/GVN military power cannot stop the DRV in the achievement of its ultimate goals.

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### HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

Since, as a part of the President's 25 January 1972 8-point proposal, we are seeking a cease-fire as a segment of an overall plan toward a peaceful and acceptable solution to the current conflict in Indochina, it seems appropriate to briefly examine the DRV military actions prior to the cease-fire in 1954.

In general terms, it should be noted that although the DRV constantly urged the Geneva Conference to give priority to discussion of a political settlement, they made certain that their military operations in the field were geared to support their political demands, to exploit the psychological and military weaknesses of their adversary, and to improve their military position should the peace negotiations break down.

When the Geneva Conference convened in 1954, the DRV was aware of the deep weariness and growing dissent in France over the war, and therefore had reason to believe that by stalling at the conference table and making maximum use of military pressure in the field, it could obtain increased military and political concessions.

Throughout the Conference, France's bargaining power was being constantly eroded in the field. Recognizing the military weaknesses of the French, the Vietminh conducted a major campaign to establish their control in contested areas. To support their claim at Geneva that they controlled almost all of Vietnam, they destroyed bridges, tore out railroad tracks, cut roads, blew up fuel depots, and destroyed a major water reservoir outside Haiphong. Additionally, in an attempt to break the morale of Vietnamese troops on the side of the French, the Vietminh launched a large scale propaganda campaign which highlighted their successful military actions, particularly their victory at Dien Bien Phu.

During the one week period between the signing of the Geneva Agreement and the actual cease-fire date, and in direct violation of an informal agreement to curtail military activity, the Vietminh blocked the Hanoi-Haiphong railroad by destroying a train, sabotaged strategic bridges and roads, attacked Vietnamese militia outposts, ambushed French units, and

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launched significant attacks along the rim of the Red River Delta. In addition, they attacked French positions near Dong Hoi and Danang. Through these military actions, the Vietminh were able to strengthen old and acquire new positions should the cease-fire have failed.

In summary, once it appeared that an agreed cease-fire was in the offing, the DRV made a point of challenging the French claim of territorial control in areas where it was precarious. They accomplished this by avoiding the commitment of major forces in open battle, while using locally superior forces against isolated French units and against positions held by the Vietnamese Army in areas from which the French had withdrawn.

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GVN, GKR AND RLG VIEWS

1. GVN. The GVN will see little reason to seek or accept a cease-fire in-place. It could, however, take a different stand in the face of a rapidly deteriorating military situation. The GVN supports US cease-fire initiatives, partly because it is convinced the other side will not agree to them and partly because it is confident that its control position vis-a-vis the enemy would, in the short term at least, be sufficiently strong provided it could achieve advantageous cease-fire terms in the negotiations. These terms would include maximum restrictions on enemy forces while subjecting GVN elements to minimum restraint, and would place high priority on effective international supervision and guarantees. While the GVN's continuing need for US support would make it amenable to our influence in negotiations, our political leverage with the GVN is diminishing as we proceed with our disengagement from the war, and would, in all probability, terminate if we attempted to force them to accept a cease-fire on what they may believe to be unacceptable terms.

2. GKR. The GKR in some respects has more to lose than either the GVN or RLG in a cease-fire, and the areas of possible disagreement with US in a cease-fire are therefore greater. The GKR would be hostile, as indeed they have already told us, to any cease-fire agreement which did not offer prospects for the withdrawal of foreign troops and which thereby left the country divided. The GKR realizes that a cease-fire in Cambodia is inseparably bound to reaching an agreement in SVN, and that the outcome in Cambodia is less important to the US than a satisfactory agreement for SVN. Therefore, the GKR's position would be weak in trying to obstruct cease-fire negotiations, and its attempts to do so would have to depend heavily on joint action with the GVN, RLG, and Asian allies. However, the GKR would recall that its negotiating tactics at Geneva in 1954 -- last minute insistence on terms somewhat more favorable than those obtained by the other non-Communist states of Indochina -- were successful, partly because of the relative unimportance of Cambodia in the details of the overall Indochina settlement. The Cambodians might try the same tactics again, although their dependence on the US for

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support would limit the scope of their protests. In any case, their concerns about our ultimate intentions should be allayed by USG assurances that we would not agree to a political settlement prejudicial to Cambodian interests.

3. RLG. The short term goals of the non-communist Lao could be attained by a cease-fire in-place which would be on military terms somewhat more favorable to the non-communist side than those of 1962. The non-communist side would hope to reduce DRV support to the LPF, geographically confine its control, and ultimately handle the Communist movement as a minority opposition political faction with the LPF presumably functioning in the cabinet and the National Assembly. The likely form of a cease-fire in Laos would separate certain military holdings with a cease-fire line and, in a very few areas, control the activities of interspersed forces. South Laos would generally lend itself more to a cease-fire line, except perhaps in the case of the provincial capitals at Saravane and Attapeu. In North Laos there are islands and salients of isolated control which would have to be recognized, and even some areas such as the Plain of Jars that would probably best be neutralized. The RLG might also be forced to abandon isolated outposts in order to get agreement on a stable cease-fire line in the crucial PDJ area. Accord on a cease-fire which would be acceptable to both Lao factions in terms and area could thus be reached; however, this would leave the question of terms in the Trail area itself which, once defined, would basically require resolution between the outside parties -- i.e., the GVN/US and DRV. In the final analysis, the RLG forces are so dependent upon US support that they would have to accept any Indochina cease-fire acceptable to the US. While Thailand would be able in theory to intervene unilaterally in parts of Laos in support of the RLG, in the absence of a more direct military threat the RTG is unlikely to take any overt measures outside Thai borders that would cause Hanoi to abandon the cease-fire. Although some Lao, particularly the Meo and some of the military and the Southerners, might complain loudly, the RLG could probably be induced to abide by a cease-fire which did not clearly lead to Communist ascendancy.

CEASE-FIRE TERMS

1. Assumptions and General Provisions.

a. Assumptions. The outcome assessments made herein are based on the following major assumptions:

(1) Redeployment of US Forces will continue following implementation of a cease-fire.

(2) US advisors and some combat service support elements will remain in-country pending final settlement.

(3) Allied aerial reconnaissance over South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos will continue.

(4) GVN/US coastal surveillance will continue, as will inland waterway reconnaissance in consonance with specific cease-fire terms (e.g. marine police).

(5) Economic aid for South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos will continue.

b. General Provisions. The general cease-fire provisions, consistent with the President's January 1972 initiative include:

(1) Cessation of all hostile military acts in, over, and in the seas around Indochina; only defensive activities permitted. This provision also specifically bans acts of terror and coercion.

(2) No augmentation of forces or supplies beyond replacement levels, throughout Indochina. In the case of weapons and ammunition this provision is defined to permit resupply of only those items consumed in the conduct of military activities explicitly permitted by the cease-fire.

(3) New construction or improvement beyond maintenance levels of military installations and fortifications is prohibited.

(4) Population resettlement is prohibited pending final settlement, except as agreed to by the negotiating parties subsequent to cease-fire implementation.

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2. Cease-Fire Issues.

a. To minimize violations which may cause changes in the status quo, additional terms to govern the location, movement and other activities of all forces, as well as agreements on methods of implementation and supervision are needed. The types of terms needed relate primarily to the ways in which the enemy might seek to change the status quo.

b. South Viet-Nam:

(1) GVN control losses which in a cease-fire could result from the enemy's effective continuation of the struggle primarily through covert actions involving both local forces and the VCI, and the threat posed by main forces located near the population and their activities in violation of the cease-fire terms. The outcomes estimates presented in the following pages assume the enemy would pursue the control struggle in a cease-fire, and take into consideration both enemy capability to violate the terms and US/GVN capability to deter violations and enforce the terms with the assistance of various supervisory mechanisms.

(2) An examination of internal security measures which would provide for improved GVN control during a cease-fire concludes that the majority of feasible actions leading to a general improvement in internal security are elements of programs already being carried out. There are additional actions which could be taken prior to a cease-fire. These include: positioning RVNAF elements closer to the less secure population centers; assigning selected RVNAF officers to GVN administrative positions at the lower levels; and planning and executing rigorous anti-VCI measures, including intensive police-type operations. However, considering the GVN's uneven performance in internal security matters, the fragility of GVN popular support and the effectiveness of enemy political warfare capability, even the full-scale implementation of current and proposed measures to improve GVN internal security would probably not alter significantly the downward trends reflected in the control outcome estimates.



c. Enemy Build-up.

(1) The following were considered in assessing the risks of a communist build-up:

(a) Levels of build-up activity that would be meaningful in terms of communist capability to resume hostilities.

(b) An assessment of the capability of the US/GVN and various supervisory arrangements to detect these levels of activity and thereby detect violations.

(c) An examination of possible enforcement measures that might be used in the event detection did not constitute an adequate deterrent.

(2) Detection of personnel augmentation, even at a relatively low level, would be relatively easy through US signal intelligence sources. In other words, if Hanoi infiltrated personnel to buildup its forces for an offensive, this could be detected, even if it were on a scale of 25,000 -- about one-fourth of last dry season's infiltration level. Enforcement, however, would be severely hampered by our inability to pinpoint the location of the violators and the lack of suitable actions short of hostile acts against what on an individual basis might be considered minor violations. This would mean that if Hanoi were to be deterred from such violations, the deterrent would probably have to involve large scale retaliations such as resumed bombing.

(3) As for supplies, the maintenance of a status quo in Indochina would require that some level of supply activity be continued by the Communists. Though arms and ammunition deliveries would not be allowed, except at replacement levels, a flow of foodstuffs, POL, and equipment needed to resupply troops "in-place" would be permitted. This "legal" flow moving from North Vietnam into the Laotian Panhandle is estimated at 129 tons per day and would not heavily burden the Communist logistics system.

(4) It should be assumed the Communists will attempt to strengthen their position during a cease-fire by building up additional supply stockpiles, including weapons and ammunition. For example, they might use

the cease-fire to build up for offensives in GVN MR's 1 and 2 or in GVN MR 1 and Cambodia. This would entail the following supply requirements:

Additional Buildup Needed for Offensive in:

<u>Legal Maintenance in</u>	<u>MR 1 and MR 2</u>	<u>MR 1 and Cambodia</u>
<u>Cease-Fire</u>		
(Short Tons)		
31,000 (Annually)	8,000	11,000
(Trucks per day)		
33	8	11

(5) Hence, the supply burden for maintenance plus a buildup during a cease-fire for either offensive option remains well within the Communists' demonstrated input capability. For example, during the 1970-71 dry season their supply input was estimated at 65,000 tons and 68 trucks per day.

(6) Our current ability to monitor the enemy supply flow is hindered by the complexity of his Laotian logistics system and the imprecise nature of our intelligence assets. Although it is possible to make a "ballpark estimate" of the level of supply activity, small changes in that level cannot be detected. Such shortcomings would preclude our determining whether the Communists were covertly breaching the cease-fire terms and building up for a future offensive. For example, the detection of 11 additional vehicles, or 3 per available vehicle input corridor, would be virtually impossible with current monitoring programs. Monitoring ability is further complicated by the Communist options of increasing the average load carried per vehicles, switching the composition of supplies by substituting weapons and ammunition for food and equipment, or increasing the amount of foodstuffs obtained from Cambodia. Finally, it is impossible to determine the amount of supplies currently stockpiled in Laos which could be moved to South Vietnam and/or Cambodia without being detected.

(7) To overcome these shortcomings and accurately assess enemy intentions as evidenced by logistic activities would require very considerable concessions on the part of the Communists. Optimum monitoring conditions would require that all input into southern Laos be made through one pass from North Vietnam (e.g. the Ban Karai Pass) and be subject to inspection for tonnage and composition by an international supervisory body. Inputs via the POL pipelines or waterways would be not allowed or would be closely supervised. Even such stringent conditions might not preclude the enemy from undertaking an offensive buildup. Sea infiltration of supplies, the depletion of available stocks in Laos, and an increase in local production and procurement cannot be effectively measured. Although a very rapid buildup probably would be detected, there would be little chance of detecting a buildup of supplies over the course of an entire dry season.

3. Two Alternative Cease-Fires. The issues presented in the previous sections are highlighted by two sets of terms that might be envisioned at either end of the spectrum of possible alternatives: one that would be favored by Hanoi and the other that would be most advantageous to our side.

a. Alternative 1. Encompasses terms that might appeal to the Communists if Hanoi should opt for a cease-fire. All forces freeze in place, with supervision provided only by the current ICC. In Laos and Cambodia, enemy and friendly forces are divided by a line approximating their current areas of control; in Cambodia the enemy also has sanctuary areas south of the line.

b. Alternative 2. Combines terms that, according to our analysis, would yield the most advantageous outcome for the GVN, GKR, and RLG. Unlike alternative 1, it allows GVN territorial forces to operate and attempt to locate enemy main forces where they are at the beginning of negotiations. It places extensive reliance on a strong ISB to enforce the provisions for keeping main forces in place and for restricting buildup of forces.

4. Description. South Vietnam terms are divided into main force, local force and supervisory terms. The terms presented below are in addition to the four general provisions already outlined.

Alternative 1

Most Advantageous  
for Hanoi

Alternative 2

Most Advantageous for  
GVN, RLG, GKR

FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

Main Forces

Main forces remain in-place as of C-Day.<sup>1/</sup> Unit locations are small (1-3 kilometers) with small defensive patrolling zones.

Enemy main forces located in sanctuary areas apart from the population. Friendly main forces would be in widespread locations throughout the country.

Local Forces

Local forces freeze in place, i.e. move no more than 200 meters from out-post, field or base locations.

GVN local forces conduct defensive operations up to two kilometers from out-posts; enemy local forces have some restrictions but may not locate in or enter GVN areas as defined by above patrolling limits.

Supervision

The current International Control Commission (ICC) investigates offenses charged by either side. A joint military commission of the belligerents facilitates cease-fire implementation.

A new, large International Supervisory Body (ISB) monitors:  
-- all main force units through on-site detachments,  
-- one enemy resupply and personnel replacement checkpoint at the Ban Karai pass through which all support must pass,  
-- other possible supply routes by land, sea and air,  
-- other provisions by detection of violations through its own initiative or in response to changes by either side.  
In addition a joint military commission is formed.

1/ Date of cease-fire implementation.

LAOS

The military forces are separated by a line dividing Laos in accordance with current force dispositions except that the Plan of Jars would be at a minimum neutralized and at a maximum returned to NVA/LPLA control. (Adjustments also might be necessary in the Bolovens Plateau.)

The military forces are separated generally by a line dividing Laos in accordance with current troop dispositions. (There might be some isolated pockets in North Laos and adjustments in the Bolovens area. Also the Plain of Jars might be neutralized.

CAMBODIA

GKR forces remain south and west of Lon Nol line; Communist forces except as noted remain north and east of line. GVN forces withdraw to RVN. Five sanctuaries granted to Communists southwest of line.

GKR forces remain generally south and west of Lon Nol line; Communist forces move and remain north and east of line; areas between Mekong and SVN border contains GKR sanctuaries. GVN forces withdraw to RVN. Routes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and the Mekong remain open for all legal traffic.

5. Alternative 1 Assessment.

a. Based primarily on expectations of enemy main force movement nearer the populated areas during cease-fire negotiations, extensive enemy violations and limited friendly violations, it is believed Alternative 1 would result in major GVN control losses of rural population, which, if the cease-fire were to last a year, would return South Vietnam to GVN control levels of mid-1969 (with further rapid decline if the cease-fire lasted longer).

ALTERNATIVE 1

	<u>Control Now</u>		<u>In Six Months</u>		<u>In a Year</u>	
	<u>RURAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>RURAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>RURAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
GVN	66%	76%	54%	69%	37%	58%
VC	2%	1%	22%	14%	36%	23%

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b. Enemy forces would rebuild fairly rapidly without great fear of detection but, because of the magnitude of VC control gains, would not find it in their interest to resume hostilities. Under these conditions the GVN would very quickly realize that delay in its reinitiation of hostilities would only further weaken its ability to counter an increasing Communist threat.

c. The significant increases in VC control apparently occurring during the first six months of a cease-fire is actually the result of the GVN military standdown. Once a cease-fire is implemented those hamlets under nighttime VC control--not now fully controlled by the VC because of fear of GVN main force activity in the day--would fall into the VC controlled category. These hamlets represent approximately 14% of the country's rural population. Following that initial change we expect that VC control gains might not be as rapid as GVN control losses since the VC will need to recruit and train new members to establish and maintain control over its new population.

d. For Laos, a cease-fire under these alternatives (as well as under the other alternatives subsequently described) would, for whatever length of time, be beneficial to the non-Communists. Political cooperation, including a coalition government, might be restored within the framework of the 1962 agreements, although some adjustments in favor of the LPF would be necessary. In the longer run, the non-Communists should be able to survive the test, outside forces permitting.

e. For Cambodia, a deteriorating situation in South Vietnam and expected enemy efforts in the south to block the LOCs to GKR traffic, might induce some change in GKR attitudes toward decreased opposition to Communist goals for South Vietnam. While it is possible that elements in Cambodia opposed to any accommodation might seek to gain power in Phnom Penh, a shift in the other direction would appear more likely.

f. This alternative would probably prove attractive to Hanoi and, from this standpoint, would be less difficult to negotiate in comparison to the other alternatives. Hanoi would achieve its goal of minimum supervision, thereby giving it an opportunity to carry on the control struggle and build-up its forces with little risk that an ineffective ICC would either detect cease-fire violations or do much about violations reported to it by our side.

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Not only would Hanoi have succeeded in placing severe limitations on GVN activities, but what little supervision the ICC could provide would more readily detect violations by GVN forces because of the more overt, visible manner in which they would operate.

g. For these same reasons this alternative would not constitute an attractive negotiating position for our side -- at least not an initial position. Certainly the GVN would resist vigorously any terms which would offer the enemy such favorable conditions by which he could significantly change the control balance in his favor by stalling on a final settlement.

h. Similarly the GKR would resist to the extent it could the concept of formally giving up all territory north of the Lon Nol line and particularly the granting of enemy sanctuaries south of this line.

i. As for Laos, the non-Communists would have considerable problems with accepting the present NVA holdings in the Bolovens and the provincial capitals of Saravane and Attapeu; and the Communists would be reluctant to accept the idea of neutralizing the Plain of Jars area. However, both would probably be attainable. Delineating the Trail area would be a problem in which the RLJ would have to play a role. Following that, the main problem -- that of the terms covering the Trail area -- would have to be negotiated between the outside parties. These considerations would apply for the other alternatives discussed in this section as well.

j. On balance, this alternative provides inadequate assurances that a cease-fire in place would not be quickly and effectively exploited by the other side to gain a military advantage, probably inducing the GVN to react and resulting in an early breakdown of the cease fire.

#### 6. Alternative 2 Assessment.

a. When compared with Alternative 1 advantages of Alternative 2 are:

(1) Enemy main forces are restricted to those sanctuary areas where they were when cease-fire negotiations began; this provision thus reduces the control advantage the enemy might gain from relocating his main forces before and during negotiations.

(2) GVN territorial forces are permitted to defend the population against probable VC incursions, their success being dependent on the relative effectiveness of the opposing forces in each area.

(3) A strong ISB consisting of three elements:

(a) A field force of about 8,200 men would monitor each main force location (59 enemy regimental sanctuaries and 252 GVN maneuver battalion locations).

(b) A field force of 2,000 would monitor supply and personnel replacement activity at Ban Karai pass and perhaps one designated port for allied support activities, conduct air reconnaissance over areas of possible supply violations and investigate charges of such violations.

(c) Investigative and administrative personnel numbering about 4,000 would administer and logistically support the field forces, conduct investigations of charges and publish findings and reports.

b. For South Vietnam such improvements over Alternative 1 would result in less severe declines in control and significantly less risk of enemy capability to build-up his forces in order to resume hostilities.

		<u>CONTROL NOW</u>		<u>IN SIX MONTHS</u>		<u>IN A YEAR</u>	
		<u>RURAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>RURAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>RURAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ALTERNATIVE 2	GVN	66%	76%	61%	73%	57%	71%
	VC	2%	1%	19%	12%	23%	14%
ALTERNATIVE 1	GVN	66%	76%	54%	69%	37%	58%
	VC	2%	1%	22%	14%	36%	23%

c. Despite the favorable countrywide ratio of GVN to VC control after a year of cease-fire -- 57% to 23% -- ten of the 44 provinces (representing 31% of the rural population) are expected to have higher VC control than GVN control. Although there would be a tendency for some provinces to reach a stable state with respect to further changes in control, trends in GVN control in most provinces would still be down at the end of a year with the group already mentioned adversely influencing their neighbors.

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d. Alternative 2 would present a much less severe risk from the point of view of an enemy buildup. However, the longer the period between cease-fire declaration and final settlement the more that risk would grow. In-country production, sea infiltration, drawdown of Laos stockpiles and minor violations on the trail would eventually result in a supply buildup. As already noted, the outcome for Laos would be similar for all alternatives. In Cambodia, because of the advantages gained by moving all Communist forces north of the Lon Nol line and the less unfavorable projection for South Vietnam, we expect that each side would attempt to consolidate the territory granted by the cease-fire. The situation would likely be stable except for small forays by either side into the other's territory and possible conflict over the KREK-CHUP area.

e. This alternative would probably be rejected by Hanoi out of hand. Specifically, Hanoi could be expected to reject the concept of confining its main forces in sanctuaries remote from populated areas while GVN main forces were widely spread throughout the country. To the extent that this would entail a degree of "withdrawal" into sanctuaries by enemy forces after they had moved toward populated areas before and during the negotiations, it would go beyond our October 1970 position of a genuine freeze-in-place by all forces. Further, the distinction made between main and local forces would add a new and difficult aspect to the negotiations. The other side would be unlikely to accept terms for local forces that would give the GVN such wide latitude to carry on active police pacification and other security operations against the VC's infrastructure and territorial forces.

f. Hanoi would also be most unlikely to consider such a strong international supervisory mechanism, and it would certainly reject any suggestion that a checkpoint be located adjacent to or within North Vietnam itself. Moreover, the task of raising an international supervisory force of over 14,000 would pose innumerable difficulties, involving protracted negotiations not only with the other side concerning the composition and operating terms for the forces but also with the potential contributing countries concerning the terms of their participation in an ISB.

g. Thus Alternative 2's terms, while more favorable for our side and probably constituting something close to what the GVN might accept, are under present conditions most unlikely to be acceptable to Hanoi.

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DESCRIPTION OF TERMS	SUPERVISION	OUTCOME			RISK	NEGOTIABILITY	CAMBODIA	LAOS
		Present	6 mo	1 yr				
<p>Main Forces freeze in place, limited defensive patrolling, 1-3 sqkm base areas. Local Forces freeze in place, 200 meter movement from position permitted.</p> <p>(Most favorable to Hanoi)</p>	<p>Current ICC investigates changes. Joint commission facilitates cease-fire implementation.</p>	<p>66%</p> <p>2%</p> <p>TOTAL POPULATION CONTROL</p> <p>76%</p> <p>1%</p>	<p>GVN 54%</p> <p>VC 22%</p> <p>GVN 69%</p> <p>VC 14%</p>	<p>37%</p> <p>36%</p> <p>58%</p> <p>23%</p>	<p>Personnel buildup detected with current assets. Materiel buildup probably go undetected. Lack of meaningful deterrence short of resumption of bombing.</p>	<p>Hanoi probably accept if the totality of its interest were served by a cease-fire. GVN would strongly resist. US should reject.</p>	<p>Forces divided by Lon Nol line w/ 5 Communist sanctuaries SW of line. GVN withdraws. Outcome: A shift toward communist control. GKR would resist acceptance within its limited ability to do so.</p>	<p>Forces divided along line of troops disposition, with adjustment in favor of LPF. Outcome: Favorable due to resulting political cooperation. Probably negotiable.</p>
<p>Enemy main forces located in isolated sanctuaries with friendly main forces widespread in the countryside. Local forces have 2 km defensive range from position. Enemy local forces have 2 km range but cannot enter GVN fan.</p> <p>(Most favorable to GVN)</p>	<p>Large, new Int. Supervisory Body (ISB) approx. 14,000 On site w/main forces. On site re-supply check point in NVN. Monitor other possible re-supply routes. Act on own initiative &amp; on request to investigate violations. Joint commission.</p>	<p>66%</p> <p>2%</p> <p>TOTAL POPULATION CONTROL</p> <p>76%</p> <p>1%</p>	<p>GVN 61%</p> <p>VC 19%</p> <p>GVN 73%</p> <p>VC 12%</p>	<p>57%</p> <p>23%</p> <p>71%</p> <p>14%</p>	<p>Personnel buildup detected. Materiel buildup detection not assured.</p>	<p>Hanoi would reject. GVN probably accept but sanctuary would cause minor difficulty.</p>	<p>Forces divided by Lon Nol line. GKR sanctuaries in communist area. GVN withdraws. Major routes of communication including Mekong open to legal traffic. Outcome: Stable situation developing. GKR resist formal loss of territory.</p>	<p>Forces divided along lines of troop disposition, with RLG sanctuary in communist area, and adjustment as necessary. Outcome: Favorable. Probably negotiable.</p>

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TAB K

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ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES OF  
AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE IN-PLACE

Three course of action can be postulated: (1) reject the DRV/PRG initiative; (2) agree to discuss the DRV/PRG initiative with hope of obtaining major concessions for the US/GVN in exchange for territorial concessions; and (3) accept the DRV/PRG initiative. Courses of action (1) and (2) have not been analyzed in detail in that the advantages and disadvantages are, for the most part, implicit in the analysis of courses of action (3). As an example, the advantages associated with course of action (1) would, when expressed in a negative context, become disadvantages under course of action (3). The following, therefore, is an analysis of the "worst case":

ACCEPT DRV/PRG INITIATIVE

ADVANTAGES

- Would stop the fighting, at least temporarily.
- Would buy time for RVNAF to regroup and continue further Vietnamization progress.
- May reduce the effectiveness of political attacks on the United States over the war in the RVN, both in this country and elsewhere.
- Civilian casualties incident to combat would be all but eliminated.
- May prompt the DRV to begin releasing US POWs.
- The DRV may soften its present demands, i.e., may not insist upon US withdrawing support of Thieu, may not insist upon a "government of national concord," etc.

DISADVANTAGES

- Would undermine the credibility of the Nixon Doctrine in the eyes of other Southeast Asian nations.
- Would be contrary to the best interests of the current administration, which has consistently stated that Vietnamization is working.

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- Would cast serious doubts on the capabilities of US Forces, particularly in view of the influx of US air power to counter the present threat.
- Would provide worldwide critics of US participation in Vietnam with a new thrust on the futility of the entire effort.
- Would have a significant psychological impact on both RVNAF and the people of South Vietnam.
- Could create political turmoil within the RVN, undermining the Thieu regime at a time when no other strong leader appears to be on the horizon.
- Would allow the enemy to reinforce, resupply, and recuperate without interference, unless a strong ISB were stipulated.
- Would detract seriously from intelligence collection on NVN infiltration and on enemy capabilities.
- Would allow the enemy to continue to exercise his capabilities for covert political-military actions, and undoubtedly would enable him to improve his control position within the RVN by strengthening his infrastructure.
- Would relieve the enemy of military pressure and thus reduce his incentive to negotiate productively other essential ingredients of a lasting settlement.
- Would, in all probability, be only a temporary cease-fire which would give an enemy determined to violate the cease-fire at a future date a better chance to infiltrate troops and supplies into populated areas.
- It would threaten the security of US/GVN Forces, which could be subjected to sudden onslaughts, carefully planned and executed, if the enemy chose to violate the cease-fire terms.
- In the absence of agreement on other basic issues, a cease-fire under such conditions would increase doubts in the RVN, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and South Korea concerning US determination to achieve a satisfactory settlement in the RVN.

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- It is highly doubtful that the GVN would accept a cease-fire in-place under these conditions. Even if forced to do so by other overwhelming considerations, any agreement by the GVN would be politically divisive and would undermine GVN hegemony in those areas it then controlled.

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